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Abstract
This paper considers a homogeneous good competitive market consisting of n local markets with given supply and demand
functions. The markets are connected by several transmission lines. For every line, the cost functions of transmission capac-
ity increment include ﬁxed and variable components. We set a problem of the total social welfare optimization and discuss
its generalization for markets with exporting and importing nodes. We distinguish several cases where the structure of con-
nections corresponds to a tree-type graph and the social welfare function is submodular or supermodular with respect to the
set of expanded transmission lines. These properties permit to employ known eﬃcient algorithms that determine the optimal
transmission capacities.
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
Markets of natural gas, oil, electricity and other resources play an important role in economies of many coun-
tries. An essential component of such markets is a transmission system. Consumers and producers are located at
diﬀerent nodes, and transmission capacities of the lines between the local markets are limited. By recent estimates,
the transmission costs may exceed 50% of the electricity price for the industry consumers in Russia. Therefore,
the problem of transmission system optimization is of practical interest.
The previous researches on such markets [2, 3, 7, 10, 12, 13] consider primarily models with a ﬁxed network
structure. Wilson [14] analyzes market architecture issues for the electric power industry. The recent paper [4]
determines the optimal transmission capacity of one line for a two-node market, taking into account transmission
losses and costs of transmission line construction. The present study aims to generalize these results for markets
with several transmission lines, where the structure of connections corresponds to a tree-type graph. We consider
the total welfare optimization problem with an account of the production costs, consumers’ utilities and the costs
of transmission lines expansion. The optimal solution in this maximization problem determines the total welfare
value that can further be reallocated by means of special economic mechanisms letting one determine all Pareto-
optimal outcomes. In our model, demand functions reﬂect possibilities for the welfare increase due to the reduction
of the energy prices at local markets. The diﬃculty of the problem under consideration is that an expansion of
∗Correspondingauthor.Tel.:+7-495-939-2491;fax:+7-495-939-2596.
E-mailaddress:foravas@yandex.ru.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevi r B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/lice ses/by-nc- d/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ITQM 2016
239 Alexander Vasin and Marina Dolmatova /  Procedia Computer Science  91 ( 2016 )  238 – 244 
any line requires valuable ﬁxed costs. If the optimal set of expanded lines was known, the problem would be
convex and we could solve it by standard tools. However, the eﬃcient search of this set under a large number of
connecting lines requires special methods. In general, the problem is NP-hard [6]. We distinguish several cases
where the social welfare function is submodular or supermodular with respect to the set of expanded transmission
lines. So the known methods of successive calculations and excluding rules are applicable ([1], [9]).
Below we assume that the transmission system works as if there is a perfect competition among intermediaries
who can buy a good at one node and sell it at the other. For many real markets, for instance, electricity markets,
the system operators regulate the ﬂows according to this assumption (see [7]). [8] studies the diﬀerent case
and provides a literature review on transmission grid expansion for electricity markets with transmission lines
controlled by private transmission companies.
2. Formal model of the market
We consider a homogeneous good market consisting of several local markets and a network transmission
system. Let N denote the set of nodes and L ⊆ N × N be the set of edges.
Every node i ∈ N corresponds to a local perfectly competitive market. Demand function Di (p) and supply
function S i (p) characterize respectively consumers and producers in the market and meet the standard condi-
tions: Di (p) is continuous and monotonically decreasing in p, where Di (p) > 0, and Di (p) → 0 as p → ∞;
S i (0) = 0 and S i (p) is non-decreasing in p. The demand function relates to the consumption utility function:
Ui (q) =
∫ q
0 D
−1 (v) dv. Supply function S i (p) determines the optimal production volume at node i for the proﬁt
maximization problem under a given price: S i (p) = Arg maxv(pv − ci(v)) , where ci(v) is the minimal production
cost of volume v at node i. Note that the total proﬁt of producers at node i under price p is Pri (p) =
∫ p
0 S i(p)dp.
For any (i, j) ∈ L, edge (i, j) represents the transmission line connecting local markets i and j. The line is
characterized by the initial transmission capacity Q0i j, the unit transmission cost e
i j
t , the cost function Ei j of the
transmission capacity increment, including ﬁxed costs ei jf and variable costs e
i j
v (Qi j,Q0i j). For any (i, j) ∈ L, let qi j
denote the ﬂow from the market i to market j, qi j = −q ji.
Thus, the total transmission costs for edge (i, j) are:
Ei j
(
qi j
)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ e
i j
f + e
i j
v
(∣∣∣qi j∣∣∣ ,Q0i j) + ei jt ∣∣∣qi j∣∣∣ , if ∣∣∣qi j∣∣∣ > Q0i j ,
ei jt
∣∣∣qi j∣∣∣ , if ∣∣∣qi j∣∣∣ ≤ Q0i j . (1)
In this paper we consider the case where the costs do not depend on the direction of the ﬂow and the ﬂows do
not change in time. Then the ﬁnal transmission capacity Qi j is |qi j| , if
∣∣∣qi j∣∣∣ > Q0i j, otherwise it is Q0i j. The cost of
the line expansion ei j(Qi j) = e
i j
f + e
i j
v (Qi j,Q0i j) is the overnight construction cost amortized over the life-time Ti j
of the line using discount rate r: ei j = r OCi j
1−erTi j (see [11] for the detailed discussion).
We distinguish ﬁxed component ei jf , assuming that e
i j
v
(
Q0i j,Q
0
i j
)
= 0 and ei jv is a monotonous convex function of
increment (Qi j−Q0i j). In many practical problems the ﬁxed components are rather substantial, and this determines
the complexity of the optimization problem considered below.
Consider the incidence matrix A =
{
ai j
}
, i ∈ N, j ∈ N corresponding to the graph G: ai j = 1, if (i, j) ∈ L ,
otherwise ai j = 0. Denote Z (i) = { j|ai j = 1} the set of nodes connected with node i.
Under any ﬁxed ﬂows of the good −→q =
(
qi j, (i, j) ∈ L
)
and production volumes −→v = (vi, i ∈ N), the consump-
tion volumes (v̂i, i ∈ N) are obtained from the balance equations:
v̂i = vi +
∑
j∈Z(i)
q ji, i ∈ N.
The total social welfare for the network market is the total consumption utility over the market minus the total
production and transmission costs:
W(−→q ,−→v ) =
∑
i∈N
[Ui
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝vi + ∑
l∈Z(i)
qli
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ − ci (vi)] − ∑
(i, j)∈L, i< j
Ei j
(
qi j
)
. (2)
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An alternative representation of this value is the total proﬁt of all the agents in the market: producers, con-
sumers and the transmission system. Indeed, under strategies −→q , −→v , the price pi(−→q , −→v ) at node i meets the
balance equation: Di (pi) = vi +
∑
j∈Z(i) q ji, i ∈ N. The producers’ proﬁt is Pri = pivi − Ci (vi), the con-
sumers surplus is CS i =
∫ ∞
pi
Di(p)dp, and the beneﬁt of the transmission system is determined as T
(−→p ,−→q ) =∑
(i, j)∈L, i< j [
(
p j
(−→q , −→v ) − pi (−→q ,−→v )) qi j − Ei j(qi j)]. Then W (−→q ,−→v ) = ∑i∈N(Pri(−→q ,−→v ) + CS i(−→q ,−→v )) + T (−→p ,−→q ).
The welfare optimization problem under consideration is
max−→q ,−→v
W(−→q ,−→v ) . (3)
The next proposition solves “a half of the problem”. Let 	S i (pi) = S i (pi)−Di (pi) denote the supply-demand
balance at node i under the given price.
Theorem 2.1. Under any ﬁxed ﬂows of the good between the local markets
(
qi j, (i, j) ∈ L
)
, the optimal produc-
tion volume at node i is vi = S i(p˜i), where p˜i meets equation 	S i (p˜i) = ∑ j∈Z(i) qi j
Proof. Proceeding from representation (2) of the total welfare, the problem (3) under a ﬁxed −→q is reduced to
independent optimization problems:
v∗i = argmaxvi
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝Ui
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝vi + ∑
l∈Z(i)
qli
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ − ci (vi)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ , i ∈ N.
According to the First Welfare Theorem [5], the solution for market i corresponds to the Walrasian equilibrium of
the market under the given ﬂows.
Consider a modiﬁcation of the total welfare concept for the case where some ﬁnal nodes are either exporting
or importing the good. At such nodes, agents from the market under consideration interact with outsiders. At
an exporting node, there is no production, and the transmitted good is sold to foreign consumers. The node i
is characterized by demand function Di(pi) for the exported good, and the total social welfare component for
this node is Wi(qσ(i)i) = qσ(i)i · D−1i (qσ(i)i) = Di(pi) · pi, where σ(i) is the preceding node for node i ∈ N. So
Wi(qσ(i)i) is the income from the sales. At the importing node, the transmission system buys the good from
foreign producers. Such node i is characterized by supply function S i(pi), and the input to the social welfare is
calculated as Wi(pi) = −qiσ(i)S −1i (qiσ(i)) = −S i(pi) · pi.
Similar modiﬁcations should be speciﬁed for foreign companies operating as producers or consumers in the
national market. Note that in the context of the national social welfare optimization not formal registration of a
company but actual distribution of its proﬁt and investments should determine its speciﬁcation as foreign.
3. Properties of the welfare function for multi-node network markets
Let us remind the deﬁnitions of submodular and supermodular functions and some of their properties, used for
maximization of these functions [9]. Function W˜(ω) deﬁned for each subset ω ∈ L¯ of ﬁnite set L¯, is submodular
(respectively, supermodular) if for every L′, L′′ ⊆ L¯ it holds that
W˜(L′) + W˜(L′′) ≥ (respectively, ≤) W˜(L′ ∪ L′′) + W˜(L′ ∩ L′′).
Submodular function W˜(L) meets the following properties.
1. Let W˜(L) ≥ W˜(L \ {i}) ∀i ∈ L. Then maxS⊆L W˜(S ) = W˜(L).
2. Let W˜(i) < W˜(∅). Then i  S ∗ := ArgmaxS⊆LW˜(S ).
3. Let W˜(S ∪ {i}) ≤ W˜(S ) for some S , i. Then ∀R ⊃ S W˜(R ∪ {i}) ≤ W˜(R).
The dual properties to the ones above determine optimization algorithms for the case of a supermodular func-
tion.
Our purpose is to ﬁnd out under what conditions the social welfare function is submodular, supermodular or
meets some similar properties that permit to employ eﬃcient algorithms for its maximization.
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In the present paper we consider only networks with tree-type graphs, where there are no cycles, loops or
multiple edges (see [4] for the study of some network markets with parallel edges or chains). Our study shows
that the desirable properties of the welfare function for a network market closely relate to the ﬂow structure and
its invariance under any increment of transmission capacities. The following examples show that in general the
function is neither submodular nor supermodular even for chain-type graphs.
Consider a market with 3 nodes and ﬂow directions that correspond to Fig.1a under any Q. Then the function
is supermodular according to Theorem 3.1 given below. If ﬂow directions meet Fig.1b, then the function is
submodular by Theorem 3.3. In general, a chain-type market may include both structures as its components and
meet none of the conditions of super- or submodularity. Moreover, ﬂow directions may change as the capacities
increase. Below we establish conditions of the ﬂow structure conservation for chain-type and star-type network
markets.
Denote W˜(L¯) the maximum social welfare of the problem in Eq. (3), where the transmission capacities are
expanded only for lines l ∈ L¯.
  1             2     3
 
                         a)
  1             2     3 
 
                           b) 
Fig. 1. Flow structures that determine (a) supermodular and (b) submodular welfare functions.
Theorem 3.1. For a chain-type market with n nodes, let the initial prices pi(
−→
Q0), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, monotonously
decrease (as in Fig. 2). Then, for any
−→
Q ≥ −→Q0, pi(−→Q) ≥ pi+1(−→Q), i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, and function W˜(L) is
supermodular. The complexity of the search for the optimal set L
∗
under
−→
Q0 = 0 does not exceed (n−1)n2 .
Proof. It suﬃces to show that the increment W˜(L ∪ i) − W˜(L) is monotonous in set L, where i  L. Let W(Qi, L)
denote the optimal welfare under given Qi and set L of expanded lines. Then
dW(Qi, L)
dQi
= pi(Qi, L) − pi+1(Qi, L) − e′iv (Qi − Q0i ), (4)
where pi(Qi, L) is a competitive equilibrium price at node i for the market (see [4] for the proof for a two-node
market). So the increment may be represented as follows:
W˜(L ∪ i) − W˜(L) =
∫ Q∗i (L)
Q0i
dW(Qi, L)
dQi
dQi =
∫ Q∗i (L)
Q0i
(pi(Qi, L) − pi+1(Qi, L) − e′iv (Qi − Q0i ))dQi, (5)
where Q∗i (L) meets the equation pi(Q
∗
i (L), L)−pi+1(Q∗i (L), L) = e′iv (Q∗i (L)−Q0i ). Under ﬁxed Qi, pi(Qi, L) increases
in L, pi+1(Qi, L) decreases in L, so the increment does not decrease in L.
The following algorithm may be used to ﬁnd the optimal set L∗ under
−→
Q0 = 0. For each l = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1,
we check whether W˜(l) > W˜(∅). Each such line is included in L∗. Then we search for the neighboring pairs that
provide an additional increment of the welfare, then for neighboring triplets, and so on. The upper bound of the
complexity of the search of L
∗
is (n−1)n2 .
Consider a star-type market with n + 1 nodes such that, under initial transmission capacity
−→
Q0, 0 is a transit
node, I1 = {1, 2, . . . ,m} is a set of producing nodes, I2 = {m + 1, . . . , n} is a set of consuming nodes (Fig. 3).
Theorem 3.2. For a star-type market, the ﬂow directions conservation holds if and only if pi(
−→
Q0||Q¯I1 ) ≥ p0(
−→
Q0||Q¯I1 ),
∀i ∈ I1, and pi(
−→
Q0||Q¯I2 ) ≤ p0(
−→
Q0||Q¯I2 ), ∀i ∈ I2, where Q¯i = ∞, i ∈ I.
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Fig. 2. Chain-type market
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Fig. 3. Star-type market
Proof. The necessity is straightforward, since the inﬁnite capacity increment is a particular case.
The logic for suﬃciency proof is as follows. If a transmission capacities increase for parallel lines connecting
producers and the transit node does not imply ﬂow inversion along any of these parallel lines, then the price in
the transit node 0 decreases monotonously. Thus, if under the maximal transmission capacities price p0 in transit
node 0 remains greater or equal to the price in node i, then for all intermediate values of transmission capacities
this is also true. The proof for consuming nodes is similar.
Theorem 3.3. Consider a star-type market that meets the conditions of ﬂow directions conservation. The social
welfare function W˜(L1∪L2), where L1 ⊆ I1, L2 ⊆ I2, is submodular in L1 under ﬁxed set L2; and is also submodular
in L2 under ﬁxed set L1.
For any L1 ⊆ I1, l ∈ I1 \ L1, the social welfare function increment W˜(l ∪ L1, L2) − W˜(L1, L2) monotonously
increases in set L2, and for any L2 ⊆ I2, l ∈ I2 \L2, the social welfare function increment W˜(L1, l∪L2)− W˜(L1, L2)
monotonously increases in set L1.
Proof. The monotonous increase of the social welfare function in the expanded set of the lines connecting con-
sumers follows from the equilibrium condition in the transit node. The expansion of the lines connecting con-
sumers leads to the increase of the demand in the transit node and, thus, the welfare increase.
To address submodularity, it suﬃces to check that, for any l ∈ I1, L, L′ ⊂ I1,
W˜(L ∪ {l}) − W˜(L) ≥ W˜(L ∪ L′ ∪ {l}) − W˜(L ∪ L′).
We consider the components of the welfare function. For ﬁxed costs, the relation holds as an equality. For the
case, where the variable expansion costs are zero, W˜(L) =
∫
min{S (p, L),D(p)}dp − ∑l∈L elf , L ⊆ I1, S (p, L) =∑
l∈L S l(p) the total welfare increment is the less, the greater the expanded set (see Fig. 4).
In a general case, we can compute and compare the social welfare in a similar way if we shift the supply and
demand functions to the central node 0. They will change according to the marginal costs e′lv (	Ql). In particular,
supply function S l(p0) for node l ∈ I1 is found from the condition: p0 = c′l(Ql)+ elt + e′lv (	Ql). The rest arguments
are the same since S l(p) remain monotonous, the equilibrium price is the point of intersection of the demand and
the total supply curves, and social welfare W˜(L¯) can be found as the integral.
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Fig. 4. The welfare W˜(L¯) increments under adding line l to the set L and to the set L ∪ L′ in a star-type market
Chain-type and star-type graphs are special cases of tree-type networks (see Fig. 5). The obtained above
results may be generalized for this case as follows.
Theorem 3.4. For a tree-type market, let producers and consumers be located in diﬀerent branches, that is the
ﬂow directions are from end nodes to the root in producing branches and from the root to end nodes in consuming
branches of the graph, see Fig. 5, and the directions do not change under any increase of transmission capacities.
Let L be a set of consecutive edges. Then the social welfare function W˜(L1, L2), where L1 ⊆ L, L2 ⊆ L \ L, is
supermodular by L1 in L. If L is a set of parallel edges, then function W˜(L1, L2) is submodular by L1 in L.
   
 
Fig. 5. Tree-type market
These properties of tree-type markets allow eﬃcient use of algorithms of submodular and supermodular func-
tions maximization in order to solve the transmission expansion problem. In the general case, the speciﬁed features
of the total welfare function do not let one improve the complexity of the search in the worst case, and this com-
plexity is exponential. However, for particular cases, it is possible to obtain much better estimates. That is, in the
case of the search covered by Theorem 3.1, the complexity is polynomial (quadratic), and Khachaturov provided
an empirical estimate of the computational complexity that is O(n4) [9].
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